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The widespread use of markets leads to unprecedented material well-being in 
many societies. We study whether market interaction, as a side effect, erodes 
moral values. In an influential paper, Falk and Szech (2013) provide 
experimental data that seem to suggest that “market interaction erodes moral 
values.” Although we replicate their main treatment effect, we show that 
additional treatments are necessary to corroborate their conclusion. These 
treatments reveal that playing repeatedly, and not market interaction, causes the 
erosion of moral values. Our paper thus shows that neither Falk and Szech’s data 
nor our data support the claim that markets erode morals. 
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Does market interaction erode moral values? Scholars have debated this question for centuries (e.g., 
Montesquieu 1748, Smith 1776, Marx 1859, Simmel 1900, Weber 1921, Schumpeter 1942, Polanyi 
1944, Hirsch 1976, Shleifer 2004, Satz 2010, Frank 2011, Sandel 2012, Bruni and Sugden 2013, 
Bowles 2016, Storr and Choi 2019). Some scholars have argued that markets foster moral values, 
while others have blamed markets for undermining them. The widespread use of markets 
undoubtedly leads to unprecedented material well-being in many societies. Nonetheless, studying 
possible harmful “side effects” of market interaction is important. A broad understanding of market 
forces, including their possible impact on moral values, is necessary for policy makers and citizens 
to make informed decisions on the spheres in society where market should govern behavior and 
where other mechanisms might be preferable. 
Studies seeking to identify the causal effect of markets on morals are scarce.1 A notable 
exception is Falk and Szech (2013), henceforth FS, who devised an intriguing experimental 
paradigm to study how markets affect morals: they measured subjects’ willingness to pay for 
avoiding the death of a mouse.2 FS gave subjects in a one-period “non-market” treatment the choice 
between EUR 10 and the life of a mouse. In a 10-period bilateral “market” treatment with random 
re-matching, subjects in the role of “sellers” and “buyers” bargained about the split of EUR 20 in 
a double auction. If the bargaining partners agreed on a split, a mouse was killed. FS find that the 
fraction of subjects willing to accept EUR 10 in their one-period non-market treatment is 
significantly lower than the fraction of sellers willing to accept EUR 10 or less in their 10-period 
bilateral market treatment. FS conclude that “market interaction causally affects the willingness to 
accept severe, negative consequences for a third party” (p. 707) and that they “have shown that 
market interaction displays a tendency to lower moral values, relative to individually stated 
preferences” (p. 710). Given the fundamental importance of the question, here we examine whether 
these conclusions are justified.3 
                                                 
1 A recent literature studies moral or socially responsible behavior in markets (e.g., Rode et al. 2008, Dufwenberg, et 
al. 2011, Bartling et al. 2015 and 2019, Hainmueller et al. 2015, Kirchler et al. 2015, Pigors and Rockenbach 2016, 
Irlenbusch and Saxler 2019, Danz et al. 2020, Ockenfels et al. 2020), but none of these papers focus on the causal 
effect of market interaction on moral values (an exception is a recent working paper by Ziegler et al., 2020). 
Correlational evidence based on cross-cultural studies shows that the level of market integration positively co-varies 
with prevailing fairness concerns in a society (Henrich et al. 2010). 
2 It was true that mice were kept alive or killed based on subjects’ decisions. The mice were so-called “surplus mice” 
from animal experiments, and the default was for them to be killed. The experimenters purchased the mice that survived 
thanks to subjects’ decisions and kept them in an appropriate environment.  
3 Earlier papers criticizing FS’s interpretation of their data include Breyer and Weimann (2015) and Sutter et al. (2020). 
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Our main point of concern is that FS compare behavior in a one-period non-market 
treatment to behavior in a 10-period market treatment. The treatment difference could thus be 
driven by the difference in the institutional context, which is what FS claim, but it might also be 
driven by the difference in the number of periods of play, or their interactions. In this paper, we 
therefore report the results of a 2×2 factorial design that varies both dimensions independently. 
We organize the paper as follows. Section 2 describes our experimental design and its 
relation to FS’s study. Section 3 presents the results, robustness checks, and a discussion of why 
playing repeatedly might undermine moral values. We conclude in Section 4.  
 
2. Experimental Design 
Subjects in our experiment must choose between either receiving additional money (up to CHF 20) 
or having the experimenter donate CHF 60 (≈USD 65) to a charity that uses this amount to fund 
the surgery for a leprosy patient in India.4 We test the hypothesis that subjects opt more frequently 
for receiving additional money—thereby accepting the consequence that a donation to charity will 
not be made—in our market treatments than in our non-market treatments. 
2.1. Market Treatments 
We randomly match subjects into pairs in our market treatments. Subjects in a pair bargain over 
the split of CHF 20 in a continuous double auction. The double auction lasts for three minutes. We 
informed the subjects that if they agree to a split, a donation of CHF 60 to fund a surgery of a 
leprosy patient in India will not be made. If a pair of subjects does not reach an agreement within 
three minutes, either because one of the two subjects refuses to agree to any split or because their 
claims are incompatible, neither subject receives an additional payment and the experimenter will 
donate CHF 60 to charity. If a pair of subjects reaches an agreement within three minutes, the 
subjects receive the respective monetary amounts, but the experimenter will not donate to the 
charity. Agreeing to a split thus imposes a negative externality on a leprosy patient in India. 
Both subjects can continuously post binding offers by entering how much of the CHF 20 
they demand for themselves (offer = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 20 − 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑). Offers can consist of any integer 
amount between 0 and 20. An improvement rule is in place, i.e., subjects must reduce their demands 
if they want to post a new offer. Only a subject’s current offer can be accepted.  
                                                 
4 Using donations to charity is a common tool to study moral behavior in the laboratory, see, e.g., Exley (2016) as an 
example. This has the advantage that studies are easy to replicate.  
4 
 
We conducted a one-period treatment, labeled Market, and a treatment were the double 
auction was played repeatedly for 10 periods, with random re-matching of the subjects, labeled 
Market-10. We informed the subjects upfront that one of the 10 periods in Market-10 would be 
randomly drawn at the end of the session and that only the decisions made in this period would be 
implemented. 
2.2. Non-Market Treatments 
We also randomly matched subjects into pairs in our non-market treatments. One of the subjects is 
an active decision maker; the other subject is a passive recipient who cannot make any decision. 
Active subjects decide for all 21 possible integer splits of CHF 20 between themselves and the 
passive subject in a pair whether to accept the additional money. The active subject’s share mirrors 
the “demand” in the market treatments and the passive subject’s share mirrors the “offer” in the 
market treatments. We informed the subjects that one of the 21 decisions would be randomly drawn 
and implemented at the end of the session, and that the experimenter would only donate CHF 60 
to fund a surgery of a leprosy patient in India if the active player rejected the randomly drawn split. 
As in the market treatments, agreeing to the receipt of additional money thus results in a negative 
externality on a leprosy patient in India.  
We conducted a one-period treatment, labeled Non-Market, and a treatment were the active 
subjects repeatedly made their decisions for all the 21 possible integer splits for 10 periods, labeled 
Non-Market-10. Subjects remained in their roles as either active or passive players throughout the 
10 periods of treatment Non-Market-10. We informed the subjects upfront that one of the 10 
periods would be randomly selected to be relevant for payments. Table 1 provides an overview of 
our 2×2 factorial design.  
 
Table 1. Treatments 
 One period 10 periods 
Market treatments Market Market-10 
Non-market treatments Non-Market Non-Market-10 
Notes: The table shows our 2×2 factorial design that varies the institutional context and the 




2.3. Discussion of Design Features 
To compare our results to those by FS, we follow FS in interpreting the negotiation of a split of a 
fixed amount of money in a bilateral double auction as a “market interaction” and the individual 
choice whether or not to accept a given amount of money in a price list as a “non-market decision.”5 
The details of our experimental design, however, differ in several ways from FS’s design.  
An evident difference is the nature of the externality. While accepting additional money 
causes the mouse’s death in FS’s study, the negative externality in our study is on a leprosy patient 
in India. We deliberately considered a different kind of externality in order to improve our 
understanding of the robustness and the contexts in which results related to the effect of markets 
on morals exist.  
We implemented additional design changes to eliminate differences between the market 
and non-market treatments in FS’s experiment that we considered to be unrelated to differences 
between market and non-market contexts. 
Subjects in FS’s non-market treatment Individual have the binary choice between EUR 10 
and a mouse’s life. In FS’s treatment Bilateral Market, pairs of subjects negotiate about the split 
of EUR 20, with the consequence that a mouse would die in case of an agreement. Hence, FS’s 
treatments Individual and Bilateral Market differ, inter alia, in the following three dimensions: (i) 
The total amount of money traded off against the mouse’s life is EUR 10 in their non-market 
treatment but EUR 20 in their market treatment. (ii) A single subject is involved in their non-market 
treatment, while two subjects are involved in their market treatment. (iii) The action space is binary 
in their non-market treatment, but there are 21 possible integer splits of EUR 20 in their market 
treatment. In contrast, we hold these three dimensions constant in our treatments: a subject’s choice 
is always whether to agree to an integer split of CHF 20 between oneself and another subject.6 
While we hypothesized that the differences outlined in this paragraph are of minor importance, 
they should nevertheless be eliminated in a clean experimental design.7 
                                                 
5 We return to the important issue of the definition of a market at the end of the conclusions. 
6 FS report two control treatments, Individual price-list and Two participants, each partly addressing that amount of 
money, number of subjects, and action space is not held constant between treatments Individual and Bilateral Market. 
However, none of the control treatments holds all three dimensions constant at the same time, as our design does. 
7 Further differences involve details of the experimental implementation, all of which we hypothesized to be of minor 
importance. First, FS exposed their subjects to a video showing how mice die from poisonous gas through slow 
suffocation. While subjects made their decisions directly after having seen the video in the individual choice treatment, 
they first played a trial period of the double auction before making their first decision in the market treatment. A time 
gap was thus present only in the market treatment, which might have attenuated a possible impact of the video on 
behavior. In our study, subjects first play a trial period of the double auction and are then informed about the externality, 
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Finally, FS implement their non-market treatment Individual as a one-period game and 
compare it to behavior in their treatment Bilateral market, which is played repeatedly for 10 
periods. We hypothesized that behavioral changes between FS’s treatments Individual and 
Bilateral Market might be driven by two differences: market vs. non-market, and playing one 
period vs. 10 periods. For this reason, we added two experimental conditions to be able to keep the 
number of periods constant, at 1 and at 10 periods, when we compare market to non-market 
behavior. Our 2×2 factorial design, as summarized in Table 1, thus allows us to separate the impact 
of these two potentially important dimensions. 
2.4. Measurement of Moral Values 
We measure moral values by eliciting subjects’ reservation prices for accepting the consequence 
that the experimenter will not donate CHF 60 for the surgery of a leprosy patient in India. The 
higher a subject’s reservation price, the higher his or her moral values. 
Consider treatments Non-Market and Non-Market-10 first. The reservation price of 
subject 𝑖𝑖 in period 𝑡𝑡, denoted by 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, is the lowest monetary payment to the subject at which he or 
she prefers the money to the donation. If subject 𝑖𝑖 prefers the donation to all splits of CHF 20 in 
period 𝑡𝑡, even to the one that gives the subject CHF 20, then 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 > 20. 
Consider treatments Market and Market-10 next. If subject 𝑖𝑖 accepts an offer in period 𝑡𝑡, 
then let 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denote the accepted amount. If subject 𝑖𝑖 does not accept any offer in period 𝑡𝑡, then 
𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 > 20. Let 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denote the lowest amount that subject 𝑖𝑖 demands (and would thus be willing to 
accept) in period 𝑡𝑡. If subject 𝑖𝑖 does not post any demand in period 𝑡𝑡, then 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 > 20. If either 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤
20 or 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 20, then the reservation price of subject 𝑖𝑖 in period 𝑡𝑡 is measured as 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =
min(𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). If a subject neither posts a demand nor accepts an offer in period 𝑡𝑡, then 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 > 20.  
Note that neither we nor FS in their study can directly observe reservation prices in the 
market treatments. Suppose, for example, that subject 𝑖𝑖 does not post a demand and accepts the 
matched subject’s offer to split the CHF 20 equally in period 𝑡𝑡. Subject 𝑖𝑖’s reservation price would 
then be measured as 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 10. However, we cannot observe the lowest monetary amount that 
                                                 
which aims to keep the time gap between being exposed to the externality and making a (first) decision constant in all 
treatments. Second, FS framed subjects’ decisions as choices between two trivia quizzes (where correct answers lead 
to additional earnings) in treatment Individual but not in Bilateral Market. We frame subjects’ decisions as choices 
between money and donation in all treatments. Third, FS label subjects in the double auction as buyers and sellers and 




subject 𝑖𝑖 would have accepted. 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is thus an upper bound because the true reservation price might 
be lower.  
For reasons of comparability with FS, we use the same aggregate measure of moral values 
that FS use, namely the fraction of subjects with a reservation value of 10 or less (𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10). As a 
robustness check, we will also consider an alternative aggregate measure of the subjects’ moral 
values, namely the fraction of subjects willing to accept any feasible amount of money (𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 20). 
This aggregate measure is unaffected (as we will explain in more detail below) by the possibility 
that a subject succeeds in getting a share of the CHF 20 that exceeds his or her reservation price. 
Finally, since treatments Non-Market-10 and Market-10 generate a measure of a subject’s 
reservation price in each of the 10 periods, the question of how to summarize the information for 
each subject arises. FS use each subject’s lowest reservation price over the course of all 10 periods 
to calculate the fraction of subjects with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10. For reasons of comparability, we will follow 
this approach, that is, 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = min𝑖𝑖 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. However, as robustness checks, we will also base our two 
aggregate measures of moral values (the fractions of subjects with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10 and the fraction with 
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 20), on subjects’ median reservation prices, and we will compare the aggregate measures 
period by period between treatments Non-Market-10 and Market-10, i.e., we study whether markets 
erode moral values in any of the 10 periods.  
2.5. Measurement of Social Norms 
A necessary condition for being able to study moral values is a context that the experimental 
subjects perceive as being morally relevant. To test whether our design is suitable for addressing 
our research question, we measured the social norm regarding the choice to accept additional CHF 
20 with the consequence that the experimenter does not donate CHF 60 for the surgery of a leprosy 
patient in India. 
 We elicited the social norm relating to the choice of taking CHF 20, i.e., the largest amount 
of money that a subject could get in our treatments, with the consequence that there would be no 
donation. Moreover, we measured the norm in a choice environment without a passive player, who 
would receive CHF 0 if the active player takes CHF 20. Moral excuses for taking the money should 
be largest when CHF 20 are at stake and no passive player without earnings is present, which stacks 
the deck against the finding that taking the money in our experimental paradigm is morally 
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inappropriate. We use the coordination game approach developed by Krupka and Weber (2013) as 
our measurement tool for the social norm.  
 A separate sample of subjects who did not participate in any of our four treatments 
participated in the norm measurement task.8 We asked these participants whether most people 
would rate a subject’s choice to take the CHF 20 as “socially acceptable and consistent with moral 
and appropriate behavior” or as “socially inacceptable and inconsistent with moral and appropriate 
behavior.” Subjects could select either “very acceptable,” “somewhat acceptable,” “neutral,” 
“somewhat inacceptable,” or “very inacceptable.” Importantly, we did not ask subjects to provide 
the rating that they believe to be right, but the rating that they believe the other subjects in a session 
would most frequently choose. We assume this social norm serves as the focal point in this 
coordination game. Subjects received CHF 10 if their answers matched the modal response.  
2.6. Procedural Details 
All sessions took place in the laboratory of the Department of Economics at the University of 
Zurich. Subjects were students from the University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology in Zurich.9 We conducted the study with z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and h-Root (Bock 
et al. 2014). Before entering the lab, subjects drew random numbers that allocated them to computer 
terminals and, in treatments Non-Market and Non-Market-10, determined a subject’s role as either 
active or passive player. Subjects received written instructions, including comprehension questions 
that they had to answer correctly before a session could begin. We provide the instructions in the 
online appendix. Sessions with one-period treatments lasted about 1 hour; sessions with 10-period 
treatments about 1.5 hours. In total, 604 subjects participated in the study. 102 active (and 102 
passive) subjects participated in six sessions of treatment Non-Market, 98 active (and 98 passive) 
subjects participated in six sessions of treatment Non-Market-10, 98 subjects participated in three 
sessions of treatment Market, and 106 subjects participated in four sessions of treatment Market-
10. Each subject received a show-up fee of CHF 15 and an additional payment between CHF 0 and 
CHF 20 depending on the decisions made in the experiment. A donation of CHF 10’860 was made 
to the Swiss charity FAIRMED, which could finance 181 basic surgeries for leprosy patients in 
India costing CHF 60 on average.   
                                                 
8 The data were collected in the context of the study by Bartling and Özdemir (2017). 
9 We thus study a different subject pool than FS, whose experiments were conducted in Bonn. Note also that the 




We first note that the subjects perceive the trade-off in our experimental paradigm as morally 
relevant. The measurement of the social norm pertaining to taking CHF 20, instead of having the 
experimenter donate CHF 60 for a leprosy patient in India, provides a clear result. 98 percent of 
the subjects (61 out of 62) believe that most subjects rate the decision to take the money as either 
“very” or “somewhat socially inappropriate.” The former is the modal choice (32 out of 62). Only 
one subject believed that “neutral” is the most frequent rating. No subject opted for “somewhat” or 
“very appropriate.” We conclude from these data that our experimental paradigm is suited for 
studying moral conflict.10  
3.1. Replication of FS’s Treatment Difference  
FS focus on the fraction of subjects with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10 for accepting negative consequences for a third 
party, when they compare moral values in their one-period treatment Individual to behavior in their 
10-period treatment Bilateral Market. In this section, we follow their approach of focusing on the 
fraction of subjects with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10 to test whether we can replicate their main empirical result. 
Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows the fraction of subjects with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10 in our treatments Non-
Market and Market-10. Panel (b) shows the fraction of subjects with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10 in FS’s 
corresponding treatments Individual and Bilateral Market.  
Figure 1 reveals that we closely replicate FS’s treatment difference. The fraction of subjects 
with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10 increases from 41.2 percent (42 of 102) in treatment Non-Market to 74.5 percent 
(79 of 106) in treatment Market-10 (two-sided Fisher exact test, 𝑝𝑝 < 0.001). These fractions are 
very similar to the respective fractions of 46.0 percent (57 of 124) and 72.2 percent (26 of 36), 
reported by FS.11 We thus observe a lower moral standard in the 10-period market treatment than 
in the one-period non-market treatment in both FS’s mouse paradigm as well as in our leprosy 
paradigm.12 We summarize this first result in the following.  
                                                 
10 These data were first reported in Bartling and Özdemir (2017). 
11 Two-sided Fisher exact tests confirm that the fractions of subjects with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10 do not differ significantly between 
our and FS’s study, neither when comparing Non-Market and Individual (𝑝𝑝 = 0.502), nor when comparing Market-
10 and Bilateral Market (𝑝𝑝 = 0.827). 
12 Taken together, the differences in our and FS’s experimental design, as outlined in Section 2.3, thus do not affect 
the results.  
10 
 
Result 1: The main treatment difference reported by Falk and Szech (2013) is 
replicated in our study: Moral values are lower in our 10-period market treatment 
than in our one-period non-market treatment.  
 
Figure 1. Replication of FS’s Treatment Difference 
 
Notes: Panel (a) shows the fraction of subjects with a reservation price of CHF 10 or less for accepting negative 
consequences for a third party in our one-period treatment Non-Market and in our 10-period treatment Market-10. The 
higher the fraction of subjects with a reservation price of CHF 10 or less, the lower the moral values. Panel (b) shows 
the respective fractions in FS’s one-period treatment Individual and in their 10-period treatment Bilateral Market. 
Error bars indicate exact binomial 95% confidence intervals. The figure reveals that moral values are lower in our 10-
period market treatment than in our one-period non-market treatment, which closely replicates the treatment difference 
between Individual and Bilateral Market reported by FS. 
 
3.2. Moral Values when Controlling for Number of Periods 
FS claim that the market institution causes the lower moral values observed in treatment Bilateral 
Market than in Individual. However, since FS compare a one-period non-market treatment to a 10-
period market treatment, their main result could equally be driven by the difference in the number 
of periods played, or by the interaction of repetition and institutional context. Our fully factorial 
design allows us to disentangle the impact of market interaction on moral values from the impact 


























































(b) Falk and Szech (2013)
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Panel (a) in Figure 2 illustrates the comparison of moral values in our market and non-
market treatments when we hold the number of periods constant at 1. We find that the fraction of 
subjects with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10 is 41.8 percent (41 of 98) in treatment Market, which is virtually identical 
to treatment Non-Market (41.2 percent, 42 of 102; two-sided Fisher exact test, 𝑝𝑝 = 1.000).  
The same finding prevails if we hold the number of periods constant at 10. Panel (b) of 
Figure 2 reveals that we do not find a significant difference between the fractions of subjects with 
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10 in treatments Non-Market-10 and Market-10. The fraction of subjects with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10 is 
69.4 percent (68 of 98) in Non-Market-10 and 74.5 percent (79 of 106) in Market-10 if we classify 
subjects based on their minimum reservation prices (two-sided Fisher exact test, 𝑝𝑝 = 0.438). The 
respective fractions are 57.1 percent (56 of 98) and 56.6 percent (60 of 106) if we classify subjects 
based on their median reservation prices (two-sided Fisher exact test, 𝑝𝑝 = 1.000). 
 
Figure 2. Moral Values when Controlling for Number of Periods 
 
Notes: Panel (a) shows that the fractions of subjects with a reservation price of CHF 10 or less for accepting negative 
consequences for a third party are virtually identical in our one-period treatments Non-Market and Market. Panel (b) 
shows that the fractions of subjects with a reservation price of CHF 10 or less in our 10-period treatments Non-Market-
10 and Market-10 are not significantly different, irrespective of whether subjects are classified according to their 
minimum reservation price (left pair of bars) or according to their median reservation price (right pair of bars) over all 
10 periods. Error bars indicate exact binomial 95% confidence intervals. The figure reveals that moral values are not 



























































Our fully factorial design thus reveals that market interaction—as implemented by FS and 
in our experiment—does not affect the willingness to accept negative consequences for a third 
party. Our data thus do not support the claim that “market interaction erodes moral values.” 
Rather, we find that playing repeatedly causes the erosion of moral values both in our 
market and non-market treatments. The fraction of subjects with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10 is significantly lower in 
the one-period than in the 10-period treatments, irrespective of whether we classify subjects 
according to their minimum reservation prices (one-sided Fisher exact test, 𝑝𝑝 < 0.001 both in the 
market and non-market treatments) or according to their median reservation price (𝑝𝑝 = 0.024 and 
𝑝𝑝 = 0.017 in the market and non-market treatments, respectively). We summarize these findings 
next. 
 
Result 2: (a) Moral values are not different in our market and non-market treatments 
if we control for the number of periods. (b) Moral values are lower in our 10-period 
than in our one-period treatments. 
 
3.3. Robustness Checks  
Figure 3 plots the cumulative distribution function of reservation prices. Panel (a) shows treatments 
Non-Market and Market; panel (b) shows treatments Non-Market-10 and Market-10. In the latter 
treatment pair, we show subjects’ minimum reservation prices.  
Panel (a) reveals that there are far fewer observations for reservation prices below 10 in 
treatment Market than in treatment Non-Market. However, there is a relatively large number of 
reservation prices of exactly 10, about 25 percent, in treatment Market, such that the fraction of 
subjects with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10 is almost identical in treatments Non-Market and Market. The vertical 
dashed line at a reservation price of 10 facilitates detecting this pattern in the figure. In contrast, 
the distributions of reservation prices above 10 is similar in treatments Non-Market and Market. 
Panel (b) shows that the exact same pattern prevails in treatments Non-Market-10 and Market-10. 
The distributions suggest that many of the subjects with a reservation price below 10 find a “trading 
partner” in the market treatments with whom they can split the CHF 20 equally.  
Figure 3 illustrates the problem that the amount a subject receives in case of an agreement 
in the market treatments can be an overestimation of his or her reservation price. Focusing on the 
fraction of subjects with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10 addresses the problem partially because this measure does not 
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distinguish between reservation prices in the range of prices up to 10. However, mismeasurement 
of reservation prices in the market treatments can affect the classification of subjects into those 
with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10 and those with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 > 10. Suppose, for example, that subject 𝑖𝑖 has a reservation price 
of 8, does not post a demand, and accepts an offer from the matched subject that gives subject 𝑖𝑖 a 
monetary payoff of 12. Subject 𝑖𝑖 would then be classified as a subject with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 > 10, even though 
subject 𝑖𝑖 is a subject with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10. In the non-market treatments, in contrast, where a price list is 
used to measure reservation prices directly, subject 𝑖𝑖 would be classified correctly. 
 
Figure 3. Cumulative Distribution of Reservation Prices 
 
Notes: Panel (a) shows the cumulative density functions of the reservation prices in treatments Non-Market (black 
line) and Market (grey line). Panel (b) shows the cumulative density functions in treatments Non-Market-10 (black 
line) and Market-10 (grey line). Subjects in the 10-period treatments are classified according to their minimum 
reservation price over all 10 periods. Subjects with a reservation price larger than 20 are included as a separate category 
to the right of the vertical dashed line at 20. The vertical dashed line at 10 highlights the fact that the fractions of 
subjects with a reservation prices of 10 or less are very similar in the market and non-market treatments, both in panel 
(a) and panel (b). The figure reveals that reservation prices below 10 are less frequent but reservation prices of exactly 
10 are more frequent in the market treatments than in the non-market treatments. The distribution of reservation values 
is relatively similar in the market and non-market treatments in the range of reservation prices above 10. 
 
As an additional robustness check of the finding that moral values are not different in our 
market and non-market treatments, we distinguish in the following between subjects who indicate 
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amounts (𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 > 20). This approach applies the same yardstick to the non-market and market 
treatments because it is not possible for a subject with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 20 to reach an agreement in the market 
treatments that gives the subject more than CHF 20, and leads to being classified as a subject with 
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 > 20. A subject might receive a share of the CHF 20 that exceeds his or her reservation price, 
but measurement error in the range of CHF 20 or less is irrelevant when we consider the fraction 
of subjects with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 20 as our aggregate measure of moral values. In our above example, subject 
𝑖𝑖 with a reservation price of 8 would be correctly classified as a subject with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 20, both in the 
market and in the non-market treatments. 
In the following, we thus study whether subjects in our market treatments are “lured” into 
accepting any amount of money up to CHF 20. We find that none of our results change. The fraction 
of subjects with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 20 is not different in the one-period treatments Non-Market and Market 
(61.8 percent (63 of 102) vs. 56.1 percent (55 of 98), two-sided Fisher exact test, 𝑝𝑝 = 0.473). The 
same holds for the comparisons between treatments Non-Market-10 and Market-10. The fraction 
of subjects with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 20 is not significantly different, irrespective of whether we base the 
classification on minimum reservation prices (78.6 percent (77 of 98) vs. 84.9 percent (90 of 106), 
two-sided Fisher exact test, 𝑝𝑝 = 0.277) or on median reservation prices (72.4 percent (71 of 98) 
vs. 74.5 percent (79 of 106), two-sided Fisher exact test, 𝑝𝑝 = 0.753). 
Using the fraction of subjects with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 20 as our aggregate measure of moral values, we 
can also replicate that playing repeatedly causes an erosion of moral values. This holds irrespective 
of whether we classify subjects according to their minimum reservation prices (one-sided Fisher 
exact test, 𝑝𝑝 < 0.001 and 𝑝𝑝 = 0.007 in the market and non-market treatments, respectively) or 
according to their median reservation prices (𝑝𝑝 = 0.004 and 𝑝𝑝 = 0.073, respectively).  
Figure 4 finally shows the fractions of subjects with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10 and with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 20 over time. 
We classify the subjects in each period according to their reservation price in that period. The figure 
shows that moral values, measured by the fraction of subjects with either 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10 (back lines) or 
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 20 (grey lines) in a given period, are very similar in every single period of treatments Non-
Market-10 (dashed lines) and Market-10 (solid lines). Irrespective of whether we consider the 
fraction of subjects with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10 or the fraction of subjects with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 20, moral values are not 
significantly different between the market and non-market treatments in any period (two-sided 
Fisher exact tests, 𝑝𝑝 ∈ {0.403; 1.000} for 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10, and 𝑝𝑝 ∈ {0.282; 1.000} for 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 20). Figure 
4 also shows that, on average, moral values are stable over time.   
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Figure 4. Moral Values over Time 
 
Notes: The black lines show the fractions of subjects with a reservation price of CHF 10 or less (𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10) for accepting 
negative consequences for a third party in each period separately. The grey lines show the fractions of subjects with a 
reservation price of CHF 20 or less (𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 20). The solid lines show the fractions for treatment Market-10; the dashed 
lines show the fractions for treatment Non-Market-10. The figure reveals that moral values, as measured by subjects’ 
reservation pieces, are very similar in treatments Non-Market-10 and Market-10. There is not a single period in which 
moral values are significantly different, irrespective of whether we consider the fraction of subjects with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10 or 
the fraction of subjects with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 20. 
 
3.4. Playing Repeatedly and Moral Values 
We found that the difference in the number of repetitions, not the difference in the institutional 
context, underlies the finding that moral values are lower in our 10-period market than in our one-
period non-market treatment. The question arises why playing repeatedly undermines moral values.  
 Here we provide a brief, exploratory analysis focussing on the fraction of subjects with 
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10 in the non-market treatments, where we can measure reservation prices directly. The 
analysis reveals a pattern that could be interpreted as being consistent with theories of moral 
licensing and moral cleansing. Moral licensing occurs if moral behavior in one period serves as a 
license for immoral behavior in a later period. Moral cleansing occurs if immoral behavior in one 
period is followed by moral behavior in a later period to restore a moral (self) image.13  
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 We find that about 40 percent of our subjects in treatment Non-Market-10 (41 of 98) 
display stable behavior; they indicate the same reservation price in each period. The remaining 
roughly 60 percent indicate different reservation prices at least once over the course of the 10 
periods. The fraction of the stable subjects with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10 in treatment Non-Market-10 is 41.5 
percent (17 of 41), which is identical to the fraction of subjects with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10 in the one-period 
treatment Non-Market (41.2 percent, 42 of 102; two-sided Fischer exact test, 𝑝𝑝 = 1.000). The 
larger overall fraction of subjects with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10 in treatment Non-Market-10 than in Non-Market 
(Result 2b) is thus entirely driven by the unstable subjects. Interestingly, if we calculate the fraction 
of unstable subjects with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10 based on these subjects’ “most moral” choices (i.e., on their 
maximum reservation prices over time), then the fraction of unstable subjects with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10 drops 
to 42.1 percent (24 of 57), which is again identical to the fraction of subjects with 𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ≤ 10 in 
treatment Non-Market (two-sided Fischer exact test, 𝑝𝑝 = 1.000). The lower moral values in 
treatment Non-Market-10 than in Non-Market (Result 2b) are thus driven by unstable subjects who 
have the same moral standards as the subjects in treatment Non-Market in at least one period 
(indicated by the unstable subjects’ maximum reservation prices), but who deviate to a lower 
standard in at least one other period (indicated by their minimum reservation prices). Unstable 
subjects’ moral choices in early periods might thus serve as a license to behave less morally in later 
periods. Likewise, the anticipation of the possibility to make more moral choices in later periods 
might allow subjects to behave less morally in earlier periods.  
 We would also like to point to the design feature that only one of the 10 periods is 
randomly selected to be relevant for payment in the games with repetition (both in FS and in our 
design), which might provide subjects with “moral wiggle room” (e.g., Dana et al. 2006, 2007). 
Since we designed our experiment to study the robustness of FS’s main finding and not to study 
exhaustively how playing repeatedly might influence (moral) behavior, we cannot disentangle the 
impact of playing repeatedly from the impact of a random payment protocol.  
 Finally, on a methodological note, our data suggest that it is generally important to 
critically assess whether behavioral patterns observed in one-shot experimental settings extend to 
settings where subjects play repeatedly, and vice-versa.14   
 
                                                 
14 Imas et al. (2020) make the same point in the context of an experimental test of regret theory, demonstrating 




We study whether market interaction erodes moral values. Our experimental design follows FS, 
who provided data that seem to show that market interaction causes the erosion of moral values. 
Our novel experimental design eliminates several differences between FS’s market and non-market 
treatments that appear unrelated to generic differences between the institutional contexts. Most 
notably, we control for the number of periods of play.  
We closely replicate FS’s main finding that moral values are lower in a 10-period market 
treatment than in a one-period non-market treatment. However, if we control for the number of 
repetitions, differences in moral values in our market and non-market treatments disappear. Our 
data clearly show that lower moral values in our 10-period market treatment than in our one-period 
non-market treatment are caused by playing repeatedly and not by the market institution. This 
finding suggests that the same holds for the difference between FS’s one-period non-market 
treatment Individual and their 10-period treatment Bilateral Market. Thus, neither Falk and Szech’s 
data nor our data support the claim that market interaction erodes moral values.  
Note that we do not show that market interaction generally does not erode moral values. 
The possibility that markets affect morals remains an interesting open research question, and FS’s 
paper deserves credit for fueling this fundamentally important debate. It appears, however, that no 
widely shared view exists of what constitutes a market. In the words of Al-Ubaydli and List (2017): 
“Somewhat perversely for a concept so central to the discipline of economics, economists scarcely 
provide a definition of a market” (p. 274). To have a meaningful debate, it will be decisive to clarify 
the features that distinguish market and non-market environments. More specifically, it will be 
useful to clarify how to think about a market in an experimental study. For example, in which sense 
is a decision taken in a price list less of a market interaction than a decision taken in a double 
action?15 Future research will then have to show, by providing clean causal evidence, whether 
markets make people selfish and corrupt, or whether markets might even encourage virtuous 
behavior. 
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In this appendix, we present English translations of the written instructions used in this study (for 
active decision makers). Original instructions were in German. The original German instructions 
are part of the replication material in the Review of Economics and Statistics Dataverse: 
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/restat  
 
1) Treatment Non-Market (instructions for active decision makers) 
 
Welcome to the Econ-Lab! 
 
Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have questions, please raise your hand; an 
assistant will come immediately to you at your desk. 
General Information 
You are participating in a study at the Department of Economics at the University of Zurich. You will 
receive a fix payment of CHF 15 for your participation; you can earn additional monetary amounts 
depending on how the study runs. You will receive your payment at the end of the study in cash. 
Please note that these instructions are only for your private information, and that communication is 
absolutely forbidden during the study. If you have questions, please address them to us. Violation of 
this rule leads to exclusion from the study and all payments. 
The data collected in this study will never be associated with your name. Your name will only be used 
in signing the receipt for your payment, meaning that your anonymity is guaranteed at all times. 
What is this about? 
In this experiment, you will be assigned anonymously to another participant, participant 2. Participant 
2 is in the role of a passive participant who can make no decisions and whose payment depends on 
your decisions. You will see a list of 21 scenarios on your monitor. You must decide for one of two 
alternatives in each scenario, alternative A or alternative B. 
Alternative A is the same in all 21 scenarios: If alternative A is realized, we will fund a necessary 
operation for a person suffering from leprosy in India, who otherwise would have no 
opportunity to have this operation. In this case, you and participant 2 will not receive any further 
monetary payment, meaning that you will receive your fixed payment of CHF 15 at the end of the 
study. 
If, however, alternative B is realized, we will not fund the operation for the person suffering 
from leprosy. In this case, you and the passive participant will receive a combined additional monetary 
payment in the amount of CHF 20. The exact distribution of the CHF 20 varies between the individual 
scenarios. 
At the end of the experiment, one scenario will be chosen randomly and your decision from the chosen 
round will be implemented. 
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We will explain the consequences of the two alternatives in more detail below. 
You have a total of three minutes of time to reach your decisions. After three minutes have expired, 
the study will continue with responses to a short questionnaire. 
The consequences of your actions 
Leprosy is a chronic infectious disease caused by the bacteria Mycobacterium Leprae; it is spread from 
person to person. The pathogen causes death of nerve cells and blockage of arteries and veins. As a 
result, there is a long-term danger of bodily disfigurement, blindness, or other permanent disabilities. 
 
    
Although the disease can be cured with medical treatment, many leprosy victims suffer from the 
consequences of disfigurement from the sickness even after the pathogen has been eradicated. 
Disfigurement from leprosy leads to a very high degree of ostracism and stigmatization, a situation 
that victims suffer from for their entire lives. However, even small surgical interventions can 
significantly reduce the scope of disfigurement. 
Almost 60% of the world’s new leprosy cases occur in India. Due to the prevalence of poverty, funding 
an operation – which would allow for a life in dignity – is not possible for most of the victims with 
disfigurement. 
 
If you select alternative A in the chosen scenario, we (the Department of Economics of the 
University of Zurich in cooperation with the Swiss relief organization FAIRMED) will fund the 
operation for a victim of leprosy in India. The cost of the operation depends on the extent of 
disfigurement. A simple procedure in India costs approximately CHF 60; the Department of 
Economics will cover this amount in full. 
If you select alternative B in the chosen scenario, we will not provide the funding. This means that 












for the person 
suffering from 
leprosy 
Alternative A CHF 0 CHF 0 
Operation will 
be done 
Alternative B CHF X 20 – CHF X 
Operation will 
not be done 
 
Each of the 21 scenarios only varies with the value of X that applies in Alternative B. X varies between 
CHF 0 and CHF 20. If, for example, X has the value of CHF 10, you and participant 2 will both earn 
an additional CHF 10, and an operation for a person suffering from leprosy will not be done if you 
select alternative B (= no operation) in the chosen round. In the same way, if X has the value of CHF 
15, then you will earn an additional CHF 15 and participant 2 will earn CHF 5 if you selected alternative 
B (= no operation) in the chosen scenario. 
If you select alternative A in the chosen scenario, you and participant 2 will each receive the fix payment 
of CHF 15, will not earn any additional payment, and the value X plays no role in your payment. 
 
How you make your decision 
You must decide in each of the 21 scenarios, i.e. for each value of X, whether you select alternative A  
(= operation for patient suffering from leprosy) or alternative B (= no operation for the patient 
suffering from leprosy). You will first be asked on the decision monitor how you decide for X = 0. 
After you have made your decision for X = 0, please make a decision for X = 1, then for X = 2, etc. 
• If you always select alternative A (i.e. for all values of X beginning with X = 0), then you must 
always click on alternative A on the decision monitor. 
• If you wish to choose alternative A for smaller values of X and want to change to B for higher 
values of X, then always click on alternative B beginning at that value of X where you wish to 
change. Please note in this case that you cannot switch back from B to A. This means that 
if you change from A to B for a certain value of X, then all higher values of X must also remain 
with alternative B. 
• If you always select alternative B (i.e. for all values of X beginning with X = 0), then you must 





Please answer the questions below to examine your understanding of the experiment. If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand. 
1) Assume that X = 8 in the scenario chosen at the end. What happens if you selected alternative B 
in this scenario? Please mark the correct answer. 
 
• You and participant 2 each earn a total of CHF 15 (fixed payment) and an operation will be 
performed on a patient suffering from leprosy. 
 
• You earn a total of CHF 23 (fixed payment of CHF 15 plus CHF 8), participant 2 earns a total 
of CHF 27 (fixed payment of CHF 15 plus CHF 12), and an operation will not be performed 
on a patient suffering from leprosy. 
 
2) Assume that X = 17 in the scenario chosen at the end. What happens if you selected alternative A 
in this scenario? Please mark the correct answer. 
 
• You and participant 2 each earn a total of CHF 15 (fixed payment) and an operation will be 
performed on a patient suffering from leprosy. 
 
• You earn a total of CHF 32 (fixed payment of CHF 15 plus CHF 17), participant 2 earns a 
total of CHF 18 (fixed payment of CHF 15 plus CHF 3), and an operation will not be 
performed on a patient suffering from leprosy. 
 
3) Assume that X = 0 in the scenario chosen at the end. 
 
• How much do you and participant 2 earn in addition to the fixed payment of CHF 15 if you 
select alternative A (= Operation)? 
Participant 2’s additional income: ____  Your additional income: ____ 
 
• How much do you and participant 2 earn in addition to the fixed payment of CHF 15 if you 
select alternative B (= No operation)? 
Participant 2’s additional income: ____  Your additional income: ____ 
 
4) The operation on a leprosy patient has the objective of  
 
• Destroying the pathogen that causes leprosy. 
 
• Strongly relieving the consequences of disfigurement due to leprosy. 
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2) Treatment Non-Market-10 (instructions for active decision makers) 
 
Welcome to the Econ-Lab! 
 
Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have questions, please raise your hand; an 
assistant will come immediately to you at your desk. 
 
General Information 
You are participating in a study at the Department of Economics at the University of Zurich. You will 
receive a fix payment of CHF 15 for your participation; you can earn additional monetary amounts 
depending on how the study runs. You will receive your payment at the end of the study in cash. 
Please note that these instructions are only for your private information, and that communication is 
absolutely forbidden during the study. If you have questions, please address them to us. Violation of 
this rule leads to exclusion from the study and all payments. 
The data collected in this study will never be associated with your name. Your name will only be used 
in signing the receipt for your payment, meaning that your anonymity is guaranteed at all times. 
 
What is this about? 
In this experiment, you will be assigned anonymously to another participant, participant 2, in each of 
ten rounds. After each round, you will be randomly assigned to a new participant 2, and you will never 
be assigned to the same person twice. Participant 2 is in the role of a passive participant who can make 
no decisions and whose payment depends on your decisions. In each round, you will see a list of 21 
scenarios on your monitor; the list is the same in all ten rounds. In each round, you must decide for 
one of two alternatives in each scenario, alternative A or alternative B. 
Alternative A is the same in all 21 scenarios: If alternative A is realized, we will fund a necessary 
operation for a person suffering from leprosy in India, who otherwise would have no 
opportunity to have this operation. In this case, you and participant 2 will not receive any further 
monetary payment, meaning that you will receive your fixed payment of CHF 15 at the end of the 
study. 
If, however, alternative B is realized, we will not fund the operation for the person suffering 
from leprosy. In this case, you and the passive participant will receive a combined additional monetary 
payment in the amount of CHF 20. The exact distribution of the CHF 20 varies between the individual 
scenarios. 
After each round, one scenario will be chosen randomly and your decision will be the result of that 
round. At the end of the experiment, one of the ten rounds will be chosen randomly and the result of 
the chosen round will be implemented. 
We will explain the consequences of the two alternatives in more detail below.  
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You have a total of three minutes of time in each round to make your decisions. The next round 
begins after three minutes have expired. The study will continue with responses to a short 
questionnaire after the tenth round. 
 
The consequences of your actions 
 
Leprosy is a chronic infectious disease caused by the bacteria Mycobacterium Leprae; it is spread from 
person to person. The pathogen causes death of nerve cells and blockage of arteries and veins. As a 
result, there is a long-term danger of bodily disfigurement, blindness, or other permanent disabilities. 
 
    
 
Although the disease can be cured with medical treatment, many leprosy victims suffer from the 
consequences of disfigurement from the sickness even after the pathogen has been eradicated. 
Disfigurement from leprosy leads to a very high degree of ostracism and stigmatization, a situation 
that victims suffer from for their entire lives. However, even small surgical interventions can 
significantly reduce the scope of disfigurement. 
Almost 60% of the world’s new leprosy cases occur in India. Due to the prevalence of poverty, funding 
an operation – which would allow for a life in dignity – is not possible for most of the victims with 
disfigurement. 
 
If you select alternative A in the chosen scenario of the round chosen at the end, we (the 
Department of Economics of the University of Zurich in cooperation with the Swiss relief 
organization FAIRMED) will fund the operation for a victim of leprosy in India. The cost of the 
operation depends on the extent of disfigurement. A simple procedure in India costs approximately 
CHF 60; the Department of Economics will cover this amount in full. 
If you select alternative B in the chosen scenario of the round chosen at the end, we will not 














for the person 
suffering from 
leprosy 
Alternative A CHF 0 CHF 0 
Operation will 
be done 
Alternative B CHF X 20 – CHF X 
Operation will 
not be done 
 
Each of the 21 scenarios only varies with the value of X that applies in Alternative B. X varies between 
CHF 0 and CHF 20. If, for example, X has the value of CHF 10, you and participant 2 will both earn 
an additional CHF 10, and an operation for a person suffering from leprosy will not be done if you 
select alternative B (= no operation) in the chosen scenario of the round chosen at the end. In the 
same way, if X has the value of CHF 15, then you will earn an additional CHF 15 and participant 2 
will earn CHF 5 if you selected alternative B (= no operation) in the chosen scenario of the round 
chosen at the end. 
If you select alternative A in the chosen scenario of the round chosen at the end, you and participant 
2 will each receive the fix payment of CHF 15, will not earn any additional payment, and the value X 
plays no role in your payment. 
 
How you make your decision 
 
You must decide in each of the 21 scenarios, i.e. for each value of X, whether you select alternative A  
(= operation for patient suffering from leprosy) or alternative B (= no operation for the patient 
suffering from leprosy). You will first be asked on the decision monitor how you decide for X = 0. 
After you have made your decision for X = 0, please make a decision for X = 1, then for X = 2, etc. 
• If you always select alternative A (i.e. for all values of X beginning with X = 0), then you must 
always click on alternative A on the decision monitor. 
• If you wish to choose alternative A for smaller values of X and want to change to B for higher 
values of X, then always click on alternative B beginning at that value of X where you wish to 
change. Please note in this case that you cannot switch back from B to A. This means that 
if you change from A to B for a certain value of X, then all higher values of X must also remain 
with alternative B. 
• If you always select alternative B (i.e. for all values of X beginning with X = 0), then you must 






Please answer the questions below to examine your understanding of the experiment. If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand. 
 
1) Assume that X = 8 in the chosen scenario of the round chosen at the end. What happens if you 
selected alternative B in this scenario? Please mark the correct answer. 
 
• You and participant 2 each earn a total of CHF 15 (fixed payment) and an operation will be 
performed on a patient suffering from leprosy. 
 
• You earn a total of CHF 23 (fixed payment of CHF 15 plus CHF 8), participant 2 earns a total 
of CHF 27 (fixed payment of CHF 15 plus CHF 12), and an operation will not be performed 
on a patient suffering from leprosy. 
 
2) Assume that X = 17 in the chosen scenario of the round chosen at the end. What happens if you 
selected alternative A in this scenario? Please mark the correct answer. 
 
• You and participant 2 each earn a total of CHF 15 (fixed payment) and an operation will be 
performed on a patient suffering from leprosy. 
 
• You earn a total of CHF 32 (fixed payment of CHF 15 plus CHF 17), participant 2 earns a 
total of CHF 18 (fixed payment of CHF 15 plus CHF 3), and an operation will not be 
performed on a patient suffering from leprosy. 
 
3) Assume that X = 0 in the chosen scenario of the round chosen at the end. 
 
• How much do you and participant 2 earn in addition to the fixed payment of CHF 15 if you 
select alternative A (= Operation)? 
Participant 2’s additional income: ____  Your additional income: ____ 
 
• How much do you and participant 2 earn in addition to the fixed payment of CHF 15 if you 
select alternative B (= No operation)? 
Participant 2’s additional income: ____  Your additional income: ____ 
 
4) The operation on a leprosy patient has the objective of  
 
• Destroying the pathogen that causes leprosy. 
 
• Strongly relieving the consequences of disfigurement due to leprosy. 
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Welcome to the Econ-Lab! 
 
Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have questions, please raise your hand; an 
assistant will come immediately to you at your desk. 
 
General Information 
You are participating in a study at the Department of Economics at the University of Zurich. You will 
receive a fix payment of CHF 15 for your participation; you can earn additional monetary amounts 
depending on how the study runs. You will receive your payment at the end of the study in cash. 
Please note that these instructions are only for your private information, and that communication is 
absolutely forbidden during the study. If you have questions, please address them to us. Violation of 
this rule leads to exclusion from the study and all payments. 
The data collected in this study will never be associated with your name. Your name will only be used 
in signing the receipt for your payment, meaning that your anonymity is guaranteed at all times. 
 
What is this about? 
In this experiment, you will be assigned anonymously to another of this study, participant 2. In a virtual 
marketplace, you can negotiate with participant 2 about the final distribution of a monetary amount of 
CHF 20. The negotiations with participant 2 can lead either to an agreement or to no agreement. If 
you reach an agreement, each of you will receive the amount that you agreed on. If you do not reach 
an agreement with one of the participants, neither participant receives anything. 
 
How the market functions 
You can negotiate with participant 2 for the period of three minutes about the distribution of CHF 20. 
This means that you can place demands of how much of the CHF 20 you should receive; participant 
2 can also make suggestions about how much of the CHF 20 he or she offers to you. You can accept 
the offer from participant 2, and he or she can accept your demands. 
Once demands and offers have been placed, they can no longer be withdrawn. When you enter 
a new demand, this must represent an improvement for participant 2, i.e. you must reduce your 
demand. The same applies for participant 2; if he or she suggests a new offer, this must be an 
improvement for you; i.e. participant 2 must increase his or her offer. 
As soon as you enter a new – reduced – demand, your previous demands can no longer be accepted. 
The same applies for offers. As soon as you receive a new offer, you can no longer accept the previous 
offer. Only the current offers and demands can be accepted. 
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You make a demand by entering the amount on your monitor that you would like to keep for yourself. 
If you enter a demand for CHF X, this means that you would like to retain CHF X for yourself and 
that participant 2 will thus receive the amount of CHF 20 – X. This demand will then be notified to 
participant 2. The same applies for offers. If participant 2 offers you CHF Y, he or she will enter it on 
the monitor. An offer of Y means that you will receive the amount of CHF Y in case of an agreement, 
while participant 2 receives CHF 20 – Y.  
Demands must be integers between CHF 0 and 20. 
The market will be closed when 




b) the three minutes have expired. 
 
Summary of the market 
 
 
You now have the opportunity to become familiar with the operation of the virtual market for three 
minutes in a test run. You will be randomly grouped with another participant in the experiment. The 
test run has no consequences and only has the objective of helping you understand how the virtual 
market functions. 
 






Assume that you see the amount of CHF 5 in the window “Current offer from participant 2”. If you 
click on “Accept current offer from participant 2”, this means that you 
• Accept the distribution “CHF 5 for me and CHF 15 for participant 2”. 
 
• Accept the distribution “CHF 15 for me and CHF 5 for participant 2” 
 
Question 2 
After you or participant 2 has accepted an offer,  
• More demands and offers can be made until the three minutes have expired. 
 
• No further demands and offers can be made because the market is closed. 
 
Part 2 (distributed only after the control questions for Part 1 were answered) 
 
After you were anonymously assigned to participant 2, the market will be open to you once for three 
minutes. The interaction with participant 2 can either lead to an agreement or not lead to an agreement. 
However, agreement or non-agreement also has consequences for a third party – a patient suffering 
from leprosy in India. 
If no agreement is reached, then we will fund a necessary operation for a person suffering from 
leprosy in India, who otherwise would have no opportunity to have this operation. In this case, 
you and participant 2 will not receive any further monetary payment, meaning that you will receive 
your fixed payment of CHF 15 at the end of the study. 
If, however, an agreement is reached, we will not fund the operation for the person suffering 
from leprosy. In this case, you and participant 2 will receive an additional monetary payment in the 
amount of the agreed sum. 
We will explain the consequences of the two alternatives in more detail below.  
If you do not reach an agreement with participant 2 within the three minute time period, the market 
will be closed with the result “no agreement”. We will then fund the operation for a leprosy patient. After 





The consequences of your actions 
 
Leprosy is a chronic infectious disease caused by the bacteria Mycobacterium Leprae; it is spread from 
person to person. The pathogen causes death of nerve cells and blockage of arteries and veins. As a 
result, there is a long-term danger of bodily disfigurement, blindness, or other permanent disabilities. 
 
    
 
Although the disease can be cured with medical treatment, many leprosy victims suffer from the 
consequences of disfigurement from the sickness even after the pathogen has been eradicated. 
Disfigurement from leprosy leads to a very high degree of ostracism and stigmatization, a situation 
that victims suffer from for their entire lives. However, even small surgical interventions can 
significantly reduce the scope of disfigurement. 
Almost 60% of the world’s new leprosy cases occur in India. Due to the prevalence of poverty, funding 
an operation – which would allow for a life in dignity – is not possible for most of the victims with 
disfigurement. 
 
If you do not reach an agreement with participant 2 about the division of the additional 
monetary payment, we (the Department of Economics of the University of Zurich in cooperation 
with the Swiss relief organization FAIRMED) will fund the operation for a victim of leprosy in India. 
The cost of the operation depends on the extent of disfigurement. A simple procedure in India costs 
approximately CHF 60; the Department of Economics will cover this amount in full. 
If you reach an agreement with participant 2 about the division of the additional monetary 
payment, we will not provide the funding. This means that if an agreement is reached, the leprosy 





Summary of possible results 
 
Result 



















CHF 0 CHF 0 
Operation will 
be done 
Agreement –  





offer within the 
three minutes 
CHF X CHF 20 – X 
Operation will 
not be done 
 
If, for example, you accept an offer from participant 2 for CHF 10, you and participant 2 will both 
earn an additional CHF 10, and an operation for a person suffering from leprosy will not be done. In 
the same way, if participant 2 accepts a demand from you for CHF 15, then you will earn an additional 
CHF 15 and participant 2 will earn CHF 5; again, an operation for a person suffering from leprosy will 
not be done. 
If both you and participant 2 do not agree to anything, you both will each receive the fix payment of 








Please answer the questions below to examine your understanding of the experiment. If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand. An assistant will come to you at your desk and answer your question. 
Please mark the correct answer below. 
 
Question 1  
If you allow the three minutes on the screen to lapse without making a demand or accepting an offer, 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will receive an operation, and you and participant 2 
will receive no further monetary payments. 
 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an operation, and you and participant 
2 will receive no further monetary payments. 
 
 
Question 2  
If you click on “Accept the current offer from participant 2”, 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will receive an operation, and you and participant 2 
each receive the agreed upon amount as an additional monetary payment. 
 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an operation, and you and participant 
2 each receive the agreed upon amount as an additional monetary payment. 
 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an operation, and you and participant 
2 will receive no further monetary payments. 
 
Question 3 
The operation on a leprosy patient has the objective of 
• Destroying the pathogen that causes leprosy. 
 




5) Treatment Market-10  
 
 
Part 2 (Part 1 is identical for treatments Market and Market-10) 
 
The market will be open to you for ten rounds lasting three minutes each. After three minutes have 
elapsed, you will be randomly assigned to a new participant 2, and you will never be assigned to the 
same person twice. At the end of the last round, one of the ten rounds will be chosen randomly and 
the result of the chosen round will be implemented. The interaction with participant 2 can either lead 
to an agreement or not lead to an agreement. However, agreement or non-agreement also has 
consequences for a third party – a patient suffering from leprosy in India. 
If no agreement is reached in the chosen round, then we will fund a necessary operation for a 
person suffering from leprosy in India, who otherwise would have no opportunity to have this 
operation. In this case, you and participant 2 will not receive any further monetary payment, meaning 
that you will receive your fixed payment of CHF 15 at the end of the study. 
If, however, an agreement is reached in the chosen round, we will not fund the operation for 
the person suffering from leprosy. In this case, you and participant 2 will receive an additional 
monetary payment in the amount of the agreed sum. 
We will explain the consequences of the two alternatives in more detail below.  
If you take no action or do not reach an agreement with participant 2 within the three minute time 
period, the market will be closed with the result “no agreement”. If this round is chosen, we will then 
fund the operation for a leprosy patient. After expiration of the ten rounds, the experiment will be 
continued with a small questionnaire. 
 
The consequences of your actions 
 
Leprosy is a chronic infectious disease caused by the bacteria Mycobacterium Leprae; it is spread from 
person to person. The pathogen causes death of nerve cells and blockage of arteries and veins. As a 
result, there is a long-term danger of bodily disfigurement, blindness, or other permanent disabilities. 
 
    
 
Although the disease can be cured with medical treatment, many leprosy victims suffer from the 
consequences of disfigurement from the sickness even after the pathogen has been eradicated. 
Disfigurement from leprosy leads to a very high degree of ostracism and stigmatization, a situation 
that victims suffer from for their entire lives. However, even small surgical interventions can 
significantly reduce the scope of disfigurement.  
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Almost 60% of the world’s new leprosy cases occur in India. Due to the prevalence of poverty, funding 
an operation – which would allow for a life in dignity – is not possible for most of the victims with 
disfigurement. 
 
If you do not reach an agreement with participant 2 about the division of the additional 
monetary payment, we (the Department of Economics of the University of Zurich in cooperation 
with the Swiss relief organization FAIRMED) will fund the operation for a victim of leprosy in India. 
The cost of the operation depends on the extent of disfigurement. A simple procedure in India costs 
approximately CHF 60; the Department of Economics will cover this amount in full. 
If you reach an agreement with participant 2 about the division of the additional monetary 
payment, we will not provide the funding. This means that if an agreement is reached, the leprosy 
patient will not receive the operation. 
 
Summary of possible results 
 
Result 



















CHF 0 CHF 0 
Operation will 
be done 
Agreement –  





offer within the 
three minutes 
CHF X CHF 20 – X 
Operation will 
not be done 
 
If, for example, you accept an offer from participant 2 for CHF 10, you and participant 2 will both 
earn an additional CHF 10, and an operation for a person suffering from leprosy will not be done. In 
the same way, if participant 2 accepts a demand from you for CHF 15, then you will earn an additional 
CHF 15 and participant 2 will earn CHF 5; again, an operation for a person suffering from leprosy will 
not be done. 
If both you and participant 2 do not agree to anything, you both will each receive the fix payment of 
CHF 15, will not earn any additional payment, and the operation will be done for a person suffering 





Please answer the questions below to examine your understanding of the experiment. If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand. An assistant will come to you at your desk and answer your question. 
Please mark the correct answer below. 
 
Question 1  
If you allow the three minutes on the screen to lapse in the round chosen at the end without making 
a demand or accepting an offer, 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will receive an operation, and you and participant 2 
will receive no further monetary payments. 
 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an operation, and you and participant 
2 will receive no further monetary payments. 
 
 
Question 2  
If you click on “Accept the current offer from participant 2” in the round chosen at the end, 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will receive an operation, and you and participant 2 
each receive the agreed upon amount as an additional monetary payment. 
 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an operation, and you and participant 
2 each receive the agreed upon amount as an additional monetary payment. 
 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an operation, and you and participant 
2 will receive no further monetary payments. 
 
Question 3 
The operation on a leprosy patient has the objective of 
• Destroying the pathogen that causes leprosy. 
 
• Strongly relieving the consequences of disfigurement due to leprosy. 
 
